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was negligent and apparently decides that there was no negligence on the
part of the defendant by saying, "The evidence presents a situation, as far
as appellant is concerned, of furnishing a condition unattended by negligence
on its part, by which the injury to appellee was caused by the subsequent
independent act of Usher (the driver), and, in such case, the existence of
the condition was not the proximate cause of appellee's injuries." If there
was no negligence on the part of the defendant, and no violation of a stat-
utory duty, the question of proximate cause was clearly not involved. The
question of proximate cause necessarily does not arise in the absence of
a breach of duty on the part of the defendant which could be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. If there is no breach of duty by the de-
fendant there is consequently nothing upon which its liability can be pre-
dicated. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, Ch. 1, Sec. 3. If, however, it
be found that there was negligence the question of proximate cause must
then be determined. This question could not be disposed of by saying that
the driver was guilty of contributory negligence. The negligence of the
driver cannot be imputed to the plaintiff. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Fan-
bion, 170 N. E. 94 (Appellate Court of Indiana, Feb. 26, 1930), and where
two causes combine to produce injuries, defendant is not relieved of liabil-
ity because he is responsible for only one of such causes. Sarber v. City of
Indianapolis, 126 N. E. 330.
The closing statement of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Remy,
"Whether, under the evidence in this case, the trainmen exercised reason-
able or ordinary care in blocking the highway for three minutes without
warning travelers on the highway was, in my opinion, a question of fact
for the jury, likewise the question as to the proximate cause of appellee's
injuries," seems to be a most accurate analysis of the problem involved.
S. J. S.
TORT - CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE - KNOWLEDGE OF PARTY CHARGED -
PROXIMATE CAusE-Appellee, a child of five years, was sent by X to appel-
lant's filling station to purchase a quart of gasoline, and was given a glass
jar of quart capacity in which to procure same. Employee of appellant
filled said jar with gasoline, delivered it into custody of the child, and cau-
tioned her to carry it in an upright position. While returning to the home
of X, appellee fell, broke the jar, and cut her hand and wrist on the broken
glass. Complaint alleged that the gasoline burned and cauterized the
wounds, and that appellant was negligent in delivering a caustic, danger-
ous substance into the custody of a child, knowing it to be such. Held,
Judgment on verdict for plaintiff reversed. Indian Refining Co. v. Summer-
land, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 2, 1930, 172 N. E. 129.
Appellant contended that the complaint on its face showed that the
proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of X in sending appellee
on said errand with the jar in question. But one negligent person cannot
escape liability for his negligence because negligence of another concurred
in producing the injury. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Co.
v. Lucas, 119 Ind. 583. If the defendant's negligence concurs with that of
another, or with an act of God, and becomes a part of the direct-and proxi-
mate cause of the injury, although not the sole cause, the defendant is
liable. This doctrine is well established. Watts v. Evansville, Mt. Carmel
& Northern Railway, 191 Ind. 27. Thus the appellant cannot escape liabil-
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ity on this ground. Appellee could have recovered from either X or the
appellant, assuming that concurrent negligence had existed. But was the
appellant guilty of any negligence, of any breach of duty of the person
injured with respect to this particular risk? The whole question of proxi-
mate cause is irrelevant until negligence is found, and should have received
little or no consideration by the court. Before there can be liability in this
type of case there must be (1) a breach of duty owed by the defendant to
the particular plaintiff (2) which proximately causes (3) damage to the
said plaintiff. If any one of these three elements is lacking, there is no lia-
bility. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, pp. 1-5. Clearly if there is
no breach of duty, there is no need to discuss proximate cause. The breach
of duty alleged by the appellee was the delivery of the gasoline to the child,
appellant knowing that it would have a caustic effect on human flesh. It
is the essence of such action that the party charged should have knowledge
that the act complained of was such as might within the domain of proba-
bility cause the alleged injury. Liggett and Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon,
132 Tenn. 419; L. R. A.-1916A-940. Thus unless it is proved that appel-
lant knew of the caustic nature of gasoline, or unless it was proved that
such was a matter of common knowledge from which it could be inferred
that as a reasonable man the appellant should have known the same, there
is no breach of duty.
The evidence did not support the allegation. As against one expert tes-
tifying that gasoline was caustic in character, five testified that it was not
caustic, but was even used as an antiseptic at times. It was entirely within
the sphere of the jury to decide on the weight of this conflicting evidence.
Calcutt v. T. H. Gerig, 271 Fed. 220. It may have rightly believed the one
as against the others, but this testimony of one expert should not stand as
evidence that the appellant knew that gasoline would have the effect charged
in the complaint. The principal case, thus being correctly reversed, merely
holds'that it is not a matter of common knowledge that gasoline is caustic,
and that the appellant's act was not proved to constitute negligence.
P. J. D.
